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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPE All S
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plai)

\ppellee

v.

Case No 20030638 CA

N A 'I 'I IA NIEI ,FR EDER ICK PENN,
Defendant/Appellant
'LYBRIhl Oh APPHLI ANT

Appellant, Natn . ..
*f of the A ppr 111 T

v a.«^ uiiouun L^ attorneys, hereby replies to the

*

-

ai gu 11 ici i l:s

cities prescind AI IIK initial Brief of Av™] lam, and makes the following
- J J!"! - >a1 points and clarifications. Any argument not specifically addressed herein is not
\* ttned, but has been bneled in the initial Uriel oi Appellant
AJiiaJMENT
I.

THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS ARE PLAINLY ERRONEOUS AND
SUBSTANTIALLY PREJUDICED PENN.
A'

I i. .1 Counsel Did Not "Invite Error."

I In < h n i T i i i i i n i f s s o l i

n p i t i i n i l M I llln iiiiiiii , iiii .tiii< '« • »

^""- r , ill),ill ill! ill i n i i n s e l

Mr. Greg Skordas, "invited error." See Brief of Appellee at 16-19. Based on this claim,
!

B> letter dateu * e' »t, HK ^^m: ,uc^ as SU ppi emen tal authority State
v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 I 1 ; u,
a Jan clarities that with regard to jury instructions,
"invited error" includes situate
nere counsel has "affirmatively endorsed an instruction,," fails to o'bject w hen specifically questioned b\ the court, has himself submitted the
insti t iction at issue,, oi has told the court that the proposed instnictions have been read and
there are no objections. See Geukgeuzian, 2004 I IT 16 at % 10- 11 None of these
situations occurred in this case.

the State asserts that this Court must bar all argument made against the instructions. The
State's argument is misguided, however, as trial counsel did object to the instructions
now at issue, and even if the objection could have been made clearer, it simply cannot be
said that Mr. Skordas invited error.
This Court must understand the context as to how the jury instruction conferences
were held. On the second day of trial after hearing evidence, the jury was excused and
told to return at 8 o'clock the next morning (R. 507 at 144). The trial court noted that it
was still attempting to prepare the written instructions it would give the following day (Id.
at 141). After the jury was excused, brief discussion took place concerning the
instructions-first regarding the drug-free zone enhancement, then the entrapment and
possession issues (Id. at 144-147).
Next, a discussion took place from which the State relies in suggesting invited
error- discussion regarding how to instruct a jury as to a physician's illegal possession of
a controlled substance (Id. at 147). The trial court proceeded to read to counsel what it
had "worked out" so far (Id. at 148). Without providing a written copy of the
instruction, the trial court queried, "does that sound about right," to which both counsel
indicated they "thought so" (Id). The court indicated that it would proceed to type up the
instructions and that counsel could pick up drafts later that afternoon to look them over
(Id. at 149). Mr. Skordas then asked what time the court wanted counsel to arrive in
the morning in order to pose objections (Id.). Thereafter, a time was set (Id). As such,
despite the characterization of the State, an "I think so" followed by a request for a formal
2

lime to make objections should not be considered an "affirmative endorsement"

i

instruction which had yet to be niian/.cu ui iuh> con^idned.
The *
r ^posed
1

e

instructions (R. 508 at J;. Mi. Skordas staled - vs. ana indicated he >* .

' lions (Id.) Because the instructions were not numbered a: the time it is imperative
. * .. '-uw.v.u. . ^. iiwiib side \>\ 2>ivk Miii-m

uy instructions given Mr.

meperidine are controlled substances. . ."" (R. 508 at 3-4). I o this instruction, Mr. Skordas
requested a short addition which was added. See Reply Brief; Addenda A (Instruction No.
!!. I \ I r Skordas then makes an objection to the "very next page" in which he
i equesls that the trial coml* strike! the last, sentence "I
which Mr. Skordas now refers is Instruction No. 6, and Mr. Skordas explicitly
requests that the trial court strike the last line (which states that a physician who fails
(in coinpl; iVilh record-keeping requirements possesses substances illegally), There is

ii it i nt to link up the "illegal language in the elements instruction" to something that

i oi illustrative purposes, a condensed VCIMUII UI me UISLUS5>K;I;
side-D) -side with the instructions in order for eacv i*omr'4ric^n TW^ * .
attached in Addenda A.
3

x

oeen placed
trson is

clarifies what makes it illegal for a doctor to possess controlled substances (Id. at 5).3
Ultimately, the trial court notes, but overrules, Mr. Skordas' objection (Id.)
While it may take a moment to actually compare the discussion to the jury
instructions, it becomes clear through the context of the discussion that Mr. Skordas
objected to the instruction now at issue, that discussion was held, and that the request to
delete the inappropriate language was overruled. Importantly, although the discussion and
objections could have been clearer had the instructions been numbered, there is simply no
basis to assert that counsel "invited error" by commenting to the court, before having a
written copy to study, that he "thinks" the instruction may be all right, when in the next
instance, trial counsel asks for a time to formally pose objections. This Court should
therefore wholly reject the State's "invited error" claim, and consider the true issues
surrounding the improper instructions.
B,

The State Improperly Disregards The Prejudicial Effects Of The
Erroneous Instructions.

Because of the improper instructions, the trial court erred and Penn was highly
prejudiced in the numerous ways set forth in Penn's opening brief. See Brief of Appellant
at 20-27.4
3

Indeed, if one looks at the last sentence of every other instruction read to the jury,
no last sentence is questionable but that of Instruction No. 6.
4

If this Court finds that Mr. Skordas did not appropriately object, this Court should
proceed with a "plain error" analysis. To establish plain error, a party must show the
following: (1) an error exists; (2) the error should have been obvious to the trial court;
and (3) the error was harmful, or in other words, absent the error, there is a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable result for the complaining party. See State v. Reyes, 861
4

First, as argued in the opening brief, the error should have been obvious to the trial
I n' ill

IKI (In a i uucwus instruction completely misstates the law and. equated a possible

misdemeanor record-kerpinp offnisv In lln li Im \ \ ml,ii m nil (intssesMuin til n umliulled
substance. See Brief of Appellant at 19-22.
Importantly, Penn was significantly prejudiced by this error. Hiding behind an
.::
vviih the abundair —v
completely misstat

h:* - t!-

. . however, tuc :>ia;e has completely failed to deal
. t -.. r s „n

kiiients of "unlawful possession ?' pw

-•* -juidance as 1o the

required elements of the newly created "record keeping" felony, and directed the jury to
. ,.:i,-i„i;... in .,
aside ihe reality thai Penn vvd& cuir

+

*^over. the Suite o n r h c r

'

apprized of such theory during a preliminary hearing. And most offensive is the fact that
the State completely disregards the idea that because the jury's attention was subverted
liiioiiii li Inn dniintiK (if ,1 i mi1,inn m i possession case,, the jury' s verdict of guilt, at
least on the Demerol and Hydrocodone co in mi; v r in mi uiipmieii u\ sulTn icni n wuiu
and warrants reversal.
"I Ins Court, therefore, she

hat the State has failed to do-address these

issues. In doing s»> MM. I i>mi »- In m li I uriiinK Hie i iptn i I |l|i n
find tha> there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict.

P.2d 1055, 105? (Utah App. 1993Moiling cases) H:ic A\ hire •

»neous instructions and

II.

THE INVALID ANTICIPATORY WARRANT MAY NOT BE
REWRITTEN BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THE STATE.
A.

The Warrant Was Not Supported By Probable Cause.

A threshold defect the State fails to address is the simple fact that the anticipatory
warrant, on its face, was not supported by probable cause. See Brief of Appellant at 2830. This is not a question of what happened at execution. This is a question regarding
what is contained in the affidavit at the time it is presented to the magistrate.
While the State fails to address this question regarding probable cause at the time
of the issuance of the warrant, in response to another issue, the State does suggest that
"there was no event other than defendant's acceptance of the offered mushrooms
that could or would establish probable cause." Brief of Appellee at 26 (emphasis
added). Accepting the truth of that statement, it becomes apparent that the warrant lacks
probable cause on its face since neither the warrant nor the supporting affidavit ever
explicitly requires acceptance-that which the State contends is the only event which
establishes probable cause. Instead, the information before the magistrate shows only that
the agent or the informant would offer the mushrooms to Penn, and this warrant,
therefore, authorized a search regardless of how Penn responded.
To further illustrate this facial lack of probable cause, this Court should compare
those facts generally held sufficient to establish probable cause in a traditional warrant to
the information provided in this case. In doing so, the language in this anticipatory
warrant is converted from future to past tense, as would be contained in a traditional non-

6

anticipatory warrant. After doing so, it becomes clear that a magistrate would be required
to reject a warrant if the affidavit merely stated that an informant had gone into a
residence, offered controlled substances to an occupant, and then was searched
afterwards. As the State seems to concede, there would be and could be no probable cause
on such minute facts. Unless it is known, and stated, that drugs were received or accepted
by the occupant of the home, there is simply no basis to conclude that controlled
substances would be found.
The concept is no different with this anticipatory warrant. The affidavit failed to
establish probable cause, and as with all warrants, the government cannot rewrite the
affidavit after the fact.
B.

The Anticipatory Warrant Is Invalid Despite Attempts To
Rewrite The Triggering Events.

With regard to the many issues surrounding the anticipatory search warrant, the
State first asserts that an appropriate reading of the affidavit requires that acceptance of
the mushrooms was the sole triggering event, see Brief of Appellee at 22-21 \ and that researching LaPlante, the undercover agent, and their vehicle were not necessary prerequisites to the search of the Penn residence, see id. at 29-30. In so arguing, the State
urges this Court to adopt what they characterize as a "common sense" reading of the
warrant. See Brief of Appellee at 22-21. This reasoning, however, has absolutely nothing
to do with common sense but is merely a request to ignore what was plainly written in the

7

affidavit and to speculate as to what the parties really meant at the time it was drafted. It
is the very approach adopted by the trial court,5 and is deficient in two respects.
First, the warrant expressly designates the re-searching of the informant, the
undercover agent and the informant's vehicle as requisite triggering events. In this case
the search warrant was executed before all required triggering events occurred.
Second, if it is necessary to rewrite the affidavit and warrant after the fact and
speculate as to what was meant, it becomes obvious that the conditions controlling the
execution were not explicit, clear and narrowly drawn, so as to avoid misunderstanding or
manipulation by government agents. See, e.g., State v. Womack, 961 P.2d 536, 544;
United States v. Hernandez-Rodriguez, 353 F.3d 1325, 1331 (10th Cir. 2003). As such, the
warrant is invalid for this reason as well.
1.

The Warrant Is Per Se Invalid Because The Expressed
Triggering Events Never Occurred.

As noted in previous briefing, Paragraph 6 of the affidavit is entitled "Anticipatory
Information" and purportedly sets forth the facts that will occur prior to any search. Of
special relevance, the paragraph specifically states:
ANTICIPATORY INFORMATION.... It is anticipated that CI and UC
will offer Penn and/or Drew the mushrooms for sale for either cash and/or
controlled substance prescriptions. After CI and UC leave the residence,
CI and UC and CPs vehicle will be re-searched.
5

See R. 481, U U 1-2 ("even though the affidavit failed to recite [it,] [t]he magistrate clearly intended that acceptance of the offer would be the trigger for execution. ..
Even though the affiant said that the confidential informant and her car would be
searched. . .this Court is confident that the magistrate would not have conditioned the
warrant's validity on the search having previously occurred").
8

R. 66 (emphasis added).
Despite black letter law to the contrary,6 the State argues that the validity of the
warrant is not contingent upon the occurrence of the expressed triggering events. Instead,
while conceding that acceptance of the mushrooms was not expressed in the affidavit,
the State wishes to rewrite the document and add what is missing. This Court must reject
this invitation to analyze the warrant based upon a hindsight determination of what the
parties may have meant rather than what they specified.
Further, the State seeks to uphold the warrant on the occurrence of less than all
necessary and explicit conditions. The State reasons:
Although the warrant can arguably be read to require that [the C.I.], the
undercover DEA agent and their vehicle be re-searched prior to the
warrant's execution, that requirement added nothing to the probable cause
established once police heard defendant accept the mushrooms... Thus,
even if the affidavit is reasonably read to require that the "re-search"
occur prior to the warrant's execution, that requirement is effectively
obviated.. .by defendant's recorded acceptance of the mushrooms.
See Brief of Appellee at 30 (emphasis added).
Contrary to this position, the requirement to re-search was not only explicit in the
anticipatory information, but failure to abide by the condition voids the warrant. The
State's novel approach of picking and choosing which conditions it will follow is

6

It is black-letter law that probable cause supporting an anticipatory warrant is
conditioned upon the occurrence of expected triggering events. See Womack, 967 P.2d at
543. It is black-letter law that the warrant or supporting affidavit must clearly set out
conditions precedent to the warrant's execution. See id; Hernandez-Rodriguez, 352 F.3d
at 1331. And, it is black-letter law that an anticipatory warrant is invalid if the triggering
event does not arise. See Womack, 967 P.2d at 543.
9

unsupported by any authority and is directly contrary to the policy behind anticipatory
warrants. Indeed,
The articulation of the triggering event serves two important purposes. First,
it ensures that the warrant will not be executed prematurely, before there is
probable cause. Second, and more importantly, it maintains judicial control
over the probable cause determination and over the circumstances of the
warrant's execution.
Hernandez-Rodriguez, 352 F.3d at 1331.
Importantly,
If the triggering event were articulated in terms of an exercise of the
officer's unfettered discretionary judgment-for example, "when events
occur that establish probable cause"-this would transfer control over
probable cause determinations from the magistrate to the law enforcement
officer, and thus undermine the purpose of the warrant requirement.
Accordingly, an anticipatory warrant is valid only if "the conditions
precedent to execution are clearly set forth in the warrant or in the affidavit
in support."
Hernandez-Rodriguez, 352 F.3d at 1331 (citing cases).
As noted above, the State argues that it was unnecessary for officers to comply
with the express requirements of the warrant because those requirements "added nothing
to the probable cause established once police overheard defendant accept the mushrooms." Stated alternatively, the State asserts that law enforcement does not need to
follow "the script" unique to anticipatory warrants once probable cause is established in
the officer's mind. Such a policy undermines the very purpose of the warrant requirement

10

as probable cause determinations will be effectively transferred from the magistrate to
individual law enforcement officers.7
Anticipatory warrants are a controversial extension of the tools provided to law
enforcement. Some jurisdictions have found them violative of state statutes and
constitutions. See Womack, 967 P.2d at 542 (noting jurisdictions finding anticipatory
warrants both valid and invalid under state law); 2 Wayne H. Lafave, Search and Seizure
§ 3.7(c), at 364-365, n. 95, n.101 (noting cases). Without exception, however, every
jurisdiction authorizing anticipatory warrants, including Utah, requires both that the
triggering events be explicit, clear and narrowly drawn, and that the warrant is invalid if
the expressed events do not occur.8 See Womack, 967 P.2d at 543. The purpose of both
requirements is to insure that the magistrate, and not a police officer, determines the
existence of probable cause. Adoption of the State's position will effectively eliminate the
warrant requirement.
2.

The State's Position Leads To The Conclusion That The
Warrant Is Invalid Since The Triggering Events Were Not
Explicit, Clear and Narrowly Drawn.

While it is Penn's position that the triggering events are explicit-i.e. the offer of
mushrooms followed by the re-search of the participants-the State opts to ignore what is
7

Since the State argues that law enforcement does not need to follow the conditions
set forth in the warrant and can search based on their own probable cause belief, under the
State's theory, it would be permissible for a magistrate to issue open-ended warrants
authorizing execution upon the officers' determination as to when probable cause exists.
8

Indeed, the warrant in this case states: "This search warrant is valid only upon the
occurrence of the events described in the affidavit for this anticipatory search warrant."
11

expressed in the warrant and urges the adoption of "acceptance" as a default triggering
event. See Brief of Appellee at 26 (reasoning that acceptance of the mushrooms was the
only viable triggering event).9 While this approach attempts to solve one problem, it
creates another as the newly implied triggering event is not explicit, clear and narrowly
drawn within the affidavit or warrant.
Undisputably, the triggering event offered by the State was never written and was
implied by the State and the trial court long after the search was executed. The State also
concedes that the affidavit "could have been more artfully drafted," and that the default
triggering event of acceptance is "not expressly stated" therein. By definition, something
not expressed can never be "explicit, clear and narrowly drawn." Consequently, where the
rule of law and constitutionality require a magistrate to clearly and narrowly write the
script for law enforcement to follow precisely, additions after the fact are absolutely

9

This case poses a situation distinct from those cases such as United States v.
Hernandez-Rodriguez, and the majority of other "anticipatory warrant" cases where a
package containing contraband is being mailed to a suspect or delivered through a postal
system. See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez-Rodriguez, 352 F.3d 1325 (10th Cir. 2003).
In such situations, courts reason that the "delivery" to the residence is a sufficient trigger,
rather than acceptance, since the contraband was on a "sure course" to the destination and
justified a search of that destination. See id, at 1331-1332. See also 2 Wayne H. Lafave,
Search and Seizure § 3.7(c), at 362-363, 369 (noting that most common use of anticipatory warrants deal with mail delivery and noting cases requiring "sure and irreversible
course"). In this case, there was no "sure course" without the requirement of acceptance,
since a mere offer to Penn did not guarantee that the contraband would be present when
the residence was searched.
12

impermissible.10 This Court must therefore reject the State's theory, invalidate this
warrant, and suppress all evidence gathered as a result.
C.

Absent Information Illegally Obtained, The Search of The
Residence Is Not Supported By Probable Cause.

The State seemingly concedes that information obtained by LaPlante during her
illegal search should have been excised from the affidavit. See Brief of Appellee at 27-29
(rather than arguing validity of LaPlante's search, asserting affidavit supported by
probable cause). The State maintains, however, that even absent such information,
sufficient detail remains to support the search of Penn's residence based on allegations of
impropriety at Penn's clinic. See id. The State errs.
A search warrant affidavit must establish a nexus between the area to be searched
and the contraband for which probable cause is established. See, e.g., United States v.
Noland, 199 F.3d 1180, 1183 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v. Rowland, 145 F.3d 1194,
1201 (10th Cir. 1998). "Probable cause to search a person's residence does not arise based
solely upon probable cause that the person is guilty of a crime." Noland, 199 F.3d at 1183
(emphasis added). "Instead, there must be additional evidence linking the person's home

10

By letter dated March 5, 2004, the State submitted the "supplemental authority"
of State v, Maestas, 815 P.2d 1319, 1324 (Utah App. 1991) for the proposition that
"[although, the sentence in question could have been clearer about the intended message,
the trial court's interpretation of the affidavit was not unreasonable." Maestas, however,
is irrelevant to the issues in this case. Not only was Maestas dealing with completely
different Franks issues, but the case did not deal with an anticipatory warrant which has
very clear, and separate rules, including the requirement for clear and explicit conditions
precedent to execution.
13

to the suspected criminal activity." Id. See also, Rowland, 145 F.3d at 1204, 1206 (citing
cases invalidating anticipatory warrants were no sufficient nexus to residence ).
Here, absent the illegally obtained information, there is absolutely no nexus linking
the Penn residence to any possible illegal activity concerning the prescription medications. What remains in the affidavit is stale information suggesting that questionable
practices may have taken place at the clinic.11 But, there is nothing in the affidavit to link
any of this alleged activity to Penn's residence, and as such, the search of the home was
improper and unconstitutional.
D.

The Search of Penn's Residence Cannot Be Saved By Claims of
Probable Cause And Exigent Circumstances.

Finally, the State attempts to save the search and argues that even if this Court hold
that the warrant is invalid, the search of the residence was permissibly based on probable
cause and exigent circumstances. See Brief of Appellee at 33-34. This argument was
never raised by the State in the trial court, the State does not argue plain error or
exceptional circumstances, and consequently, this Court should refuse to address this
claim raised for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 2002 UT App.
317,114, cert, granted, 65 P.3d 1190 (Utah 2003) (barring City's justification for entry
into residence where City failed to raise issue in trial court); State v. Montoya, 937 P.2d

1

indeed, while information in the affidavit suggests that questionable prescribing
practices may have been taking place at the clinic, that narcotics were left out on shelves
at the clinic, that pharmacies sometimes complained about the clinic, and that
medications at the clinic was allegedly missing, nothing in the affidavit linked this
questionable activity to the Penn residence.
14

145,149-151 (Utah App.1997) (declining to address State's justification of search
incident to arrest, probable cause and exigency that was raised for first time on appeal).
Moreover, invoking the theory of probable cause and exigency cannot save this
otherwise illegal search. It is well-established that an individual residence is afforded
special constitutional protection since "physical entry of the home is the chief evil against
which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed." Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 585 (1980). See also, Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748 (1984). Admittedly, a
"warrantless search" of a residence is permissible where probable cause and exigent
circumstances are proven. See State v. Yoder, 935 P.2d 534, 540 (Utah App. 1997). But,
"when a private residence is involved, the State's burden in proving probable cause and
exigent circumstances is 'particularly heavy.'" Id. (citation omitted). See also, State v.
Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 13 (Utah App. 1993).12
Because protection of the home is so fundamental, when claiming exigent
circumstances, "the need for an immediate search must be apparent to the police, and so

12

"Exigent circumstances are those that would cause a reasonable person to believe
that entry. . .was necessary to prevent physical harm to the officers or other persons, the
destruction of relevant evidence, the escape of the suspect, or some other consequence
improperly frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts." Beavers, 859 P.2d at 18.
Exigency is based on the totality of the circumstances, and "does not evolve from one
individual fact." City ofOrem v. Henrie, 868 P.2d 1384, 1388, 1392 (Utah App 1994)
Among factors to consider include: the distance to the nearest magistrate; the availability
of a telephonic warrant; the feasability of a stake-out while a warrant is being obtained;
the seriousness of the offense; the ongoing and continuing nature of the investigation; the
extent of probable cause; and the conduct of the investigating officers. See id. at 1392.
Notably, in "planned arrest" situations, it is highly difficult to meet the exigency prong.
See id. at 1391.
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strong as to outweigh the important protection of individual rights provided by the
warrant requirement." State v. South, 885 P.2d 795, 799 (Utah App. 1994), rev 'd on other
grounds, 924 P.2d 354 (Utah 1994) (citation omitted). Moreover, just because there may
exist probable cause that controlled substances are involved, an automatic exigent
circumstance based on destruction of evidence does not arise. See South, 885 P.2d at 800.
This is so, because "unlike an automobile, a home cannot simply be driven away with its
contents which may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained." Id, (internal
quotations omitted). "Rather, the home will still be there when officers return with a
search warrant" and furthermore, "officers can secure a home while a search warrant is
obtained." Id. "Therefore, the mere fact that a controlled substance may be removed,
hidden, or destroyed is not, in and of itself, an exigent circumstance." Id. "To so hold
would essentially undermine the exigent circumstance requirement [as] most forms of
evidence can be destroyed . . . " Id. (internal quotations omitted).
In the present case, the State contends that officers had probable cause to search
the entire residence once Penn accepted the mushrooms. See Brief of Appellee at 33. The
obvious problem is that rather than arresting Penn for a crime committed in their
presence, the agents left the residence. Thus, while a search for $80 worth of mushrooms
may have been appropriate incident to an arrest made contemporaneous with the
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acceptance of the contraband, once the officer left, there was no basis for a warrantless
entry or search of the home.13
Further, probable cause was still lacking to justify a search for any evidence
beyond the mushrooms. Recognizing this, the State attempts to justify the search for the
prescription narcotics adding the "police knew defendant had been fired from the hospital
for using drugs/'14 Such assertion is unavailing, provides no nexus that narcotics would
be found at the residence, and even if there was some accuracy, such information was
stale.
Next, as their requisite exigent circumstance, the State offers the conclusory claim
that the substances could be hidden, removed, or destroyed. As noted above, however, the
law requires more. See South, 885 P.2d at 800. In this case, there is absolutely no
evidence in the record establishing an exigent circumstance that would justify a search
absent a valid warrant. No facts show that Penn knew he was being investigated, that he
was likely to quickly dispose of the mushrooms, or that he posed any risk or danger to
13

Even a constitutionally permissible "search incident to arrest" would not have
uncovered the demerol and hydrocodone found in the back of the refrigerator and a
bathroom medicine cabinet, well out of Penn's reach, and in areas where no weapons
were likely hidden. See, e.g., State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973, 979 (Utah App. 1998)
(citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) and noting that search of area
reasonably within arrestee's immediate control is permissible incident to arrest, but there
is no justification "for routinely searching any room other than that in which arrest
occurs-or, for that matter, for searching through all desk drawers or other closed or
concealed areas").
l4

Because this issue was never raised below the record is incomplete. In reality, Dr.
Penn was not fired from the hospital, he resigned, and his leaving had nothing to do with
any allegation regarding controlled substances (R. 507 at 71-72, 115-118).
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anyone. Officers could have easily continued to watch the home in order to obtain a valid
warrant.
Nor is there any justifiable reason or exigent circumstance to search the entire
house for the demorol and hydrocodone. On this point, any claim that destruction of
evidence posed an exigent circumstance is simply unavailing since the confidential
informant reported the whereabouts of these substances weeks prior to the search. If the
exigency did not exist weeks previously, then it cannot be said to exist at the time of the
invalid search.
IV.

RELIEF FROM THIS COURT IS WARRANTED WHERE THE
STATE FAILED TO DISCLOSE MATERIAL INFORMATION.
A.

A Constitutional And Statutory Violation Has Been Established.

The State claims that "the defendant did not establish that the state failed to
disclose material information, about Lisa's cooperation." Brief of Appellee at 34.
Unfortunately, the State fails to support this position and make any showing to the
contrary. Focusing instead on what was or was not marshaled,15 the State simply does not
address the true issue.
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The State alleges a failure to marshal by not mentioning trial counsel's opening
statement, cross-examination of LaPlante, or closing argument which "demonstrate
counsel's strategic use of evidence of the disposition." Brief of Appellee at 37. The State
misses the issue. Penn has never alleged that the disposition of Gene LaPlante's case was
unknown. In fact, Penn clearly states that trial counsel was aware of the disposition. See
Brief of Appellant at 41. However, the actual deal made between Lisa LaPlante and the
County Attorney was never disclosed. This is the issue the State fails to recognize-an
issue appropriately briefed and one that remains uncontroverted.
18

The uncontroverted and marshaled facts establish that the State entered into a
"deal" with their most important witness at trial. The "deal" was not based on a mere
hope or expectation on the part of the witness, but was an express agreement that the
State would make the aggravated assault charges of her husband "go away" in exchange
for assistance. Most importantly, the unchallenged record establishes that the existence of
the deal was never revealed to the defendant.16
It is well established that "[w]hen the 'reliability of a given witness may well be
determinative of guilt or innocence,' non disclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls
within th[e] general rule of Brady." Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972).
Thus, while there may be a basis for disagreement in regards to the prejudice
associated with these violations, the record before this Court clearly establishes that
the State failed in its statutory and constitutional obligations.17

16

Mr. Skordas submitted an affidavit establishing that he was never made aware of
the deal (R. 398-400). Although the State argues that the trial court implicitly rejected
trial counsel's affidavit, the State offers no support for that conclusion. Further, if the
State contested the assertions in the affidavit, they had ample opportunity to present
further affidavit or testimony from Mr. Benge, the trial attorney for the State.
17

The existence of the deal was not the only violation. The State also failed to
disclose that at the relevant time period, LaPlante's husband was being investigated for
other crimes (R. 505 at 19-26, 28-31), and failed to provide additional investigative
interviews of witnesses Angie Stoughton, Marie Packard, and pharmacist Mike Goyne,
one of which testified at trial. All were noted during the motion for new trial and have
been preserved (R. 351 (noting that reports of interviews with Angie Stoughton, Marie
Packard, and pharmacist Mike Goyne, have not been provided); R. 505 at 47-50; R.425426). The reports were finally provided for the first time after the hearing on the motion
for a new trial (R. 505 at 50-52; R. 456-471). Such information was critical to the
defendant's investigation of the case and takes another bite from the fairness of this trial.
19

B.

The Defendant Was Prejudiced By The Discovery Violation And
A New Trial Is Required.

A new trial based on the prosecution's failure to disclose material evidence is
appropriate when a defendant's substantial rights have been affected. See Strickler v.
Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999). Prejudice occurs when the failure to disclose
affects basic fundamental rights-such as the right to a fair trial. See United States v.
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995). Here, both
the failure to reveal the existence of the deal as well as the State's untruthful argument to
the jury of the witness's motivation for testifying was prejudicial and limited not only trial
counsel's ability to fully investigate and cross examine, but also limited the jury's ability
to fully consider the credibility of the key witness.
The State defends, however, that trial counsel adequately cross-examined
LaPlante, and in doing so, both Penn and the jury was informed of the disposition of her
husband's charges.18 The State further notes that the jury was made aware of LaPlante's
anger toward Penn and was instructed that they could consider bias and motive of a
witness in considering the case. See Brief of Appellee at 34-35. Thus, the State reasons
that because Penn's trial counsel knew of the disposition of Gene LaPlante's charges, the
State had no obligation to reveal the actual deal. See id. at 36-37. Such logic in no way
excuses the State's failure of its duty, and the true question is not whether the knowledge
18

The State attempts to avoid accountability for its discovery violation and make
this issue a simple question of ineffective assistance. See Brief of Appellee at 38-39; R.
505 at 16-17. Make no mistake, this issue revolves around both an absolute violation of
the State's duty, as well as an ineffective assistance claim.
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of the disposition obviates the discovery violation, rather it is whether the established
violation was sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new trial.
In reality, while Penn's counsel presented argument and elicited facts hoping that
the jury would infer the existence of a deal, trial counsel could go no further because he
had been deliberately kept in the dark by the State. Several cases guide why this scenario
is prejudicial to the defendant and requires reversal. For example, in People v. Savvides, 1
N.Y.2d 554 (N.Y.App.1956), cited favorably in Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269-270
(1959), the defendant was convicted based on testimony of a witness who had made an
undisclosed deal with the State. See Savvides, 1 N.Y.2d at 554. Reversing the conviction,
the appellate court noted the inherent danger and unreliability of such testimony.
Where a promise of leniency or other consideration is held out to a selfconfessed criminal for his co-operation, there is grave danger that, if he be
weak or unscrupulous, he will not hesitate to incriminate others to further
his own self-interest. Long experience in granting leniency to "cooperative" accomplices has undoubtedly shown the hazards in the
practice... It requires no extended discussion, however, to establish
that the existence of such a promise might be a strong factor in the
minds of the jurors in assessing the witness' credibility and in
evaluating the worth of his testimony. The failure to disclose an
"understanding" or a promise cannot but seriously impair the jury's
ability to pass upon this vital issue.
Id. at 557 (emphasis added).
As in this case, neither the Savvides defendant nor the jury were notified of the
actual deal made between the cooperating witness and the government. Also as in this
case, defense counsel elicited testimony at trial inferring that a deal had been made.
Notably, the Savvides court rejected the same argument now posed by the State-that an
21

inference of a deal is sufficient to remedy the prosecution's failure to disclose. The court
rightfully explained "that [an inference] is a far cry from positive knowledge that [the
witness] had actually been assured consideration in return for continued co-operation and
that he had deliberately lied about the matter on the stand." Id. at 558.
The United States Supreme Court also recognizes the prejudicial effects of nondisclosure of deals made for witness testimony. See, e.g., Napue, 360 U.S. at 270 ("we do
not believe that the fact that the jury was apprized of other grounds for believing that the
witness.. .may have had an interest in testifying against petitioner turned what was otherwise a tainted trial into a fair one.. .Had the jury been apprized of the true facts.. .it
might well have concluded that [the witness] had fabricated testimony in order to curry
the favor of the very representative of the State who was prosecuting the case in which
[the witness] was testifying"); Giglio, 405 U.S. at 151-155 (reversal required for nondisclosed promise of leniency made to key witness despite vigorous cross-examination
seeking to reveal possible agreements).
All of these cases support the proposition that the State must disclose deals it has
made to material witnesses and must not allow false testimony or information to be
presented to the jury. The prosecution in this case failed in both respects. Not only did the
State fail to disclose the deal, the prosecution affirmatively argued to the jury that Lisa
LaPlante was the one who "contacted the city police" because of her "concerns" based
upon observations made as an employee at Penn's medical clinic (R. 506 at 46). Because
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the true story had not been revealed, the prosecutor's version of events went
unchallenged, leaving the jury with a false impression regarding critical facts.
Only subsequent to the trial was it learned that during a conversation with police
regarding her husband's criminal case, that a police officer first proposed to LaPlante
that if she would be willing to provide information regarding Penn, it might help her
husband's case (R. 502, Exhibit 5 at 32-34). In a subsequent meeting at the Grand County
Attorney's office, an agreement was reached wherein the State agreed to make Gene
LaPlante's case "go away" in exchange for Lisa LaPlante's assistance against Penn (R.
502, Exhibit 5 at 36). Importantly, when explaining after trial the sequence of events and
why she only came forward when the offer was made regarding her husband's charges,
LaPlante admitted that up to that point, she believed [Penn] was "fundamentally a good
doctor" but things had "changed in an instant" (R. 502, Exhibit 5 at 118-120).
Undisputably, the State never disclosed the actual agreement or the facts regarding
how it came into existence. More outrageous, the State then had the audacity to
affirmatively and untruthfully argue to the jury that LaPlante came forward out of an
altruistic concern for society. Such actions undermined the fairness of the trial, tainted the
jury, and this Court must remedy the situation.
V.

IRRELEVANT AND PREJUDICIAL "BAD ACTS" EVIDENCE WAS
IMPROPERLY ADMITTED.

Several instances of irrelevant and prejudicial "bad acts" evidence was improperly
admitted after being brought to the attention of the trial court and after objection by trial
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counsel. Further, if this Court finds that counsel's objections were not specific enough,
this Court may still find plain error.
Trial counsel filed a motion in limine regarding objections to anticipated testimony
of LaPlante and her alleged observations of Penn in his medical practice. (R. 139-141).
This motion put the trial court on notice that LaPlante had made several statements to
officers regarding alleged interactions and observations of Penn and his conduct at work,
including questionable prescribing practices. In the motion, such statements and instances
of alleged "bad acts" were objected to on relevancy grounds pursuant to Utah Rule of
Evidence 402, and although not specified as a Rule 403 objection, were also argued to be
unduly prejudicial (See id.). This motion was specific enough to put the court on notice of
potential relevancy and prejudicial issues concerning anticipated allegations of Penn's
prior acts, was specific enough to cover all the instances of prejudicial testimony set forth
in the Brief of Appellant, and at the very least, the trial court abused its discretion in
allowing such evidence without "scrupulous examination" after being notified that such
issues would arise during trial.
Beyond the motion in limine, numerous instances of prejudicial and irrelevant
instances of bad acts were admitted over the objection of counsel.19 As such, and for
19

Specifically, testimony was elicited over objection that: Penn attempted to
commit suicide (R. 506 at 64); LaPlante found Penn one time in a room of the clinic
sleeping, with a tourniquet-like object and bent needles on floor (Id. at 65); and at times
Penn acted weird all day, would walk into walls, and would dictate but not recall what he
was talking about or the patients he had seen (Id.). This specific testimony came about in
response to State questions asking whether during "the winter of 2001 and going into
2002, did [LaPlante] notice any aberrant behavior of Dr. Penn?" (Id.). In response,
24

the reasons set forth in previous briefing, these irrelevant and prejudicial allegations were
not scrupulously analyzed by the trial judge, should not have been allowed, and
prejudiced Penn.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing as well as the argument, points, and issues raised in the
Brief of Appellant, Appellant Penn urges this Court to find that numerous reversible
errors were made in this case that prejudiced the outcome of this trial. As such, this Court
should reverse Penn's conviction on Counts II and III, due to insufficient evidence, and
remand the remainder of the case for a new trial.
DATED this

I/'

day of March 2004.

JAMES C. BRADSHAW
AT)fN MARIE TALIAFERRO
torneys for Appellant Penn
LaPlante began that Penn had attempted suicide and Mr. Skordas objected. The
prosecution answered that the testimony was relevant to show what behavior led the
witness to believe Penn was using controlled substances. The trial court overruled the
objection and allowed the line of questioning, stating "let's keep rolling."(7d. at 64-65).
After the objection was overruled, LaPlante continued explaining observations of alleged
aberrant behavior detailing the tourniquet observation and statements that Penn
sometimes "acted weird."
Specific testimony was also elicited that Penn and Drew used mushrooms on a
previous occasion {Id. at 65-66). This questioning was objected to on hearsay and
relevancy grounds {Id. at 65). The testimony was allowed to establish the basis for why
the matter was brought to the attention of the DEA {Id. at 65-66).
Finally, abundant testimony was allowed alleging that Penn engaged in illegal
prescription practices {Id. at 149). All of this was objected to as set forth in the pre-trial
motion in limine.
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THE COURT
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THE COURT

So you want ate to give the statute

to the jury to read?
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SKORDAS

No, no

I want you to quit at
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the end of the statute, which is what you would have

13

done had you not added that last sentence

14

is the statute

15

way that makes sense logically to the jurors
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would be my only request with respect to that

17

instruction
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You paraphrased it, but I think in a

BBWGE

and that

I guess I would ask that it

I think in the rest of the course of the
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6
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SKORDAS

13

it's obvious, but I've had enough jurors ask me

6
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7

exception

8

important to (inaudible)

A couple, your Honor
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MR

SKORDAS

The next instruction

(inaudible)
THE COURT

You want me to give that one'
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That was sort of iffy whet her you want me to or not
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won't give that if you don't want me to, Mr

14

but I think it helps your client more than it
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I
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There's a jury instruction that
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assumed that those are part of the Court's records
THE COURT
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I was bothered by it until I

begins, your Honor, it's about number seven or eight,
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read it enough times, and I agree
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guess I'm a skeptic when ] see things
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hydrocodone and meperidine are controlled substances
it's a very short

instruction
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THE COURT
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MR

SKORDAS
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And may be legally prescribed

begins, although a person
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instruction
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THE STATE OP UTAH,
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Plaintiff,

In order to obtain a conviction, the state must prove each
element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

Those elements

are as follows:
COUNT I: POSSESSION OP PSILOCHN IN A DRUG FREE ZONE
1. That on or about April 20, 2002,

COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS
TO THE JURY

2.

NATHANIEL FREDERICK PENN,
Defendant.
MEMBERS OP THE JURY:

*?

INSTRUCTION NO.

Defendant possessed psilocin,

3.

In a drug free zone, and

4.

Knowing what it was and intending to possess it.

COUNT II: IMBQAIi POSSESSION, OF nmPCPPONg IN ft DRUG FRKg

The defendant, NATHANIEL FREDERICK PENN, is accused by
an Information filed in this Court by the County Attorney of

1.

Brand County, State of Utah, of having committed the following
crimes:

2.^

in violation of Section 58-37-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953

is .amended, in that the said defendant, on or about April 20,

In a drug free zone,

4.

Without a prescription or otherwise complying with

COUNT III: TTJffflftl. POSSESSION OF PBffiROL IM ft DRUG FREE ZQNB
1. That on or about April 20, 2002,

ntentionally possess a controlled substance, i.e., psilocin, in
drug free zone.

3.

the law

002, at Grand County* State of Utah, did knowingly and

2.

Defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed

demerol,

OUHT 2:
HLAWFDL POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE IN A DRUG FREE
3NE,

Defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed

hydrocodone,

MLAKFOL POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE IN A DRUG FREE .
SONS,

That on or about April 20, 2002,

in violation of Section 58-37-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953

3.

In a drug free zone,

4.

Without a prescription or otherwise complying with

the law

> amended, in that the said defendant, on or about April 20,
If you believe that the state has proved each of these
)02, at Grand County, State of Utah, did knowingly and
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find defendant
ttentionally possess a controlled substance, i.e., hydrocodone,
guilty. If the state has failed to prove any one of those elements
beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find defendant not guilty.
DUHT 3:
INSTRUCTION NO.

*

NLAWFUL POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE IN A DRUG FREE
Drug Free Zone means at or within 1,000 feet of any
ONE,

in violation of Section 58-37-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953
public or private elementary or secondary school or the grounds

B amended, in that the said defendant, on or about April 20,
of any of those schools.
002, at Grand County, State of Utah, did knowingly and
ntentionally possess a controlled substance, i.e., demerol,
Lthout a valid prescription or order, in a drug free zone.

INSTRUCTION NO.

£

Hydrocodone and meperidine (or demerol) «n> controlled
substances that may be legally prescribed and legally possessed.

JURY INSTRUCTION NO.

2-

Psilocin o^hallucinogenic mushrooms may never be legally
prescribed and cannot be legally possessed except for law

It is my duty to instruct you about the law applicable to this

enforcement purposes.

le and your duty to follow that law in deciding what happened and
sther the defendant is guilty.

You must base your decision on

i evidence introduced at this trial.
Do not allow sympathy for the defendant or respect for the
aecutor to influence your decision.

INSTRUCTION NO.

still obtain a prescription for any controlled substances for

The charge itself is no
personal use.

dence of guilt.

JO

Phyfn,ri»n« lirpnaad to prescribe-controlled substances-wust-

Physician's licensed to dispense or administer

You should not be affected by emotion,
controlled substances are also permitted to possess reasonable

judice or speculation.

Do not worry about the result of your

diet.

quantities of controlled substances for dispensing or
administering to patients, but they are required to keep a record

You must conscientiously and dispassionately consider the
of controlled substances received for that purpose and dispensed
or administered by them as physicians.

A physician who fails to

comply with this requirement possesses those substances
illegally.

